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Abstract 
This paper analyses how the existence of unemployment affects the conventional 
approach to vertical externalities. We discuss the optimality rule for the provision of 
public inputs both in a unitary and in a federal state. Our findings indicate that 
decentralising spending responsability on public inputs in the presence of 
unemployment allows output to be closer to the first best level. Moreover, we 
describe the inability of the federal government, behaving as a Stackelberg leader, 
to replicate the unitary outcome, unless there are new policy instruments at 
government's disposal. 
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Introduction 
The standard approach to vertical externalities establishes that sharing taxes 
between different levels of government has an impact on efficiency. From the 
seminal contribution by Keen (1998), a number a papers has dealt with this issue, 
offering various solutions which may internalise this problem (see, for instance, 
Boadway and Tremblay, 2006). A common issue in all these contributions is 
assuming distortionary taxation. 
Another common feature in this literature is the assumption of a competitive labour 
market, with the labour force matching exactly the demand for labour. Papers such 
as Dahlby and Wilson (2003) and Kotsogiannis and Martinez (2008) give a central 
role to the supply and demand for labour in determining equilibria but always with 
labour market clearing. In such a world, there is no scope for one of the 
conventional fiscal policies aimed at fighting unemployment, namely the provision 
of public inputs. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, no paper so far has dealt with 
vertical expenditure externalities (caused by the provision of productivity-enhancing 
public expenditures in a federal context) in the presence of unemployment. This 
has not been the case when horizontal externalities are involved (Ogawa et al, 
2006). 
This paper precisely combines vertical externalities and labour market 
imperfections in a single model. Indeed, we build a theoretical framework in which 
the federal government is in charge of unemployment benefits and the states 
provide a public input with positive effects on demand for labour. Such a theoretical 
framework finds some real parallells in the international evidence so long as in 
countries like Spain, the US or Australia (just to name a few) the allocation of 
spending responsibilities and taxes across tiers of government is of the kind we are 
considering here. Taxes are assumed to be lump-sum because we are interested 
in focusing on the efficiency implications derived from the expenditure side of 
government decisions rather than on vertical tax externalities. Anyway, we will 
show that ignoring distortionary taxation as a policy variable may play a crucial role 
for correcting the vertical externality. 
The results in the paper may be summarised as follows. First, we show that, in 
spite of using exclusively lump-sum taxes to finance governments, a vertical 
expenditure externality arises when unemployment exists. This confirms a previous 
result found in the literature (Dahlby and Wilson, 2003; Martinez, 2008), namely, 
that both vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities are independent of each other. 
The provision of public inputs creates a positive vertical impact on federal revenues 
as long as this type of public spending increases the demand for labour and, 
therefore, it reduces the resources needed at federal level for paying 
unemployment benefits. And this occurs without the co-occupancy of elastic tax 
bases. 
Moreover, we also see how the rule for the provision of public inputs at state level 
is closer to the production efficiency condition than that corresponding to a unitary 
country with a non-clearing labour market. Obviously, this does not imply that 
decentralisation is closer to optimality than centralisation but the fact that the 
assignment of distorting instruments (i. e., the public input) across different levels 
of government really matters for assessing optimality. 
Second, we have analysed whether the federal government is able to replicate the 
outcome of a unitary country. As is standard in much of the earlier literature, we 
have assumed that the upper level government knows the states' reaction 
functions and therefore behaves as a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the state 
governments. Our results deviate from the earlier studies so long as the federal 
government has not sufficient policy instruments at its disposal to implement the 
unitary equilibrium. This is a consequence of using lump-sum instruments. 
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In a sense, these results are related to the discussion initiated by Sato (2000), who 
has shown that the ability of the federal government to replicate second-best 
results depends on what type of policy instrument is available to the federal 
government. Precisely, as result of taking into consideration a new (non-lump-sum) 
policy instrument, i. e., a public input provided by the federal government that is 
complement to that offered by the states, the upper level of government is able to 
replicate the second-best outcome of a unitary country. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of 
the model and the different versions of the optimality rule for the provision of public 
inputs. Sections 3 and 4 evaluate the ability of the federal government to replicate 
the unitary outcome. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
The Basic Model 
This section aims to show two results. First, we characterise the equilibrium in a 
centralised country with unemployment. This allows us to see how the optimal rule 
for the provision of public inputs is modified in the presence of unemployment. It 
will also serve as a benchmark scenario with which we can compare the federal 
equilibria to be analysed below. Second, the benchmark model presented in this 
section also highlights that the fiscal decisions taken by one level of government 
(particularly that with spending responsibilities on public inputs) will affect the other 
levels of the public sector. As a consequence, vertical expenditure externalities will 
arise even though only lump-sum taxes are used to raise revenue in the public 
sector. 
The theoretical framework consists of firms, households and two different tiers of 
government: the federal level and k  subnational states.1 Firms are identical across 
the country and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that their number is 
normalised to one in each state. All of them produce a single good on the basis of 
the following production function: 
  ,,, 1  GKNGKNF        (1) 
where N  is labour, K  a fixed factor and G  a public input. Such a production 
technology allows us to qualify the public input as factor-augmenting.2 In this 
context, the public spending will increase the return to the fixed production factor 
K , which we normalised to one, in which case the profit can be expressed as:  
  ,, wNGNF             (2) 
where w is the wage rate.3 The first-order condition for profit maximisation 
reads ),( GNFw N , and it implictly defines the demand for labour as: 
     1111 1, wGGwN           (3) 
                                                                                                         
1 We do not denote the states by sub-indexes for making easier the notation and given that they are 
assumed to be identical. 
2 An alternative approach would imply a production function with constant returns to scale in all the 
inputs (private and public). This would be the case of firm-augmenting public input. It would create 
economic rents that, in terms of the model we develop here, would not exhibit substantial differences 
with respect to what we obtain below. 
3 The return to labour is not affected by the public input, although this would be the normal situation with 
factor-augmenting public inputs. This is not the case here because we are interested in considering the 
impact of the public input on employment, and the demand for labour we obtain below implies that the 
wage rate is independent of ),( gMw . In a model with full-employment, however, we should set up 
),( gMw . 
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By combining equations (2) and (3), we obtain the profit function: 
 Gw,               (4) 
We assume that all households have the same preferences for consumption c  
across the federation and these preferences are described by a utility function 
)(cu , which is increasing in c . Each state is populated by three types of 
consumers: a firm-owner as well as employed and unemployed workers, 
respectively. These consumer types are denoted by the superindices "f", "e" and 
"u". The firm-owner is endowed with a fixed factor of production K , which the firm-
owner hires to the firm in return for the firm´s profit. His budget-constraint is defined 
by ffc   , where f  is a lump-sum tax. Regarding the other two types of 
consumers, we make a distinction between the total labour force available for 
working, M , and the number of households that effectively are employed N . 
Obviously, full employment is characterised by NM  . The budget constraint for 
an employed worker is ee wc  , where e  is a lump-sum tax, while the budget 
constraint facing an unemployed worker is given by bcu  , where b  denotes a 
net of tax unemployment benefit. 
In a centralised country, for the policy variables  Gbef ,,, , the government 
maximises a utilitarian welfare function 
  fue kuuNMkkNuW            (5) 
subject to the following budget constraint: 
  0 bNMkkGkkN fe       (6) 
In a situation where there is no unemployment, the first-order conditions are as 
follows: 
    ff uFOC  :        (7) 
    ee uFOC  :        (8) 
  1: GFGFOC        (9) 
  ,0:  GNFOC fe       (10) 
where   is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government´s budget 
constraint. The first two equations show the standard result from optimisation with 
lump-sum taxes and transfers: the private marginal utility (of each type of 
consumer) must be equal to the social welfare cost of taxation, which here is 
captured by the Lagrange multiplier  . Equation (9), in turn, is the standard 
production efficiency condition in the provision of public inputs. Finally, (10) is the 
budget constraint of central government, where the last term of LHS in (6) can be 
dropped as there is full employment and NM  . 
Let us now turn to the equilibrium with unemployment. It is assumed that the 
existence of a minimum wage, ow , which exceeds the market-clearing wage, ew , 
creates unemployment so that NM  . This modification will have an impact on 
the optimal provision of G . In addition, the first-order condition for the 
unemployment benefit b  must also be taken into consideration. The first-order 
conditions for b  and G  are 
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    uubFOC :              (11) 
 
    .1:  GGeGueG FbNNuuNGFOC          (12) 
Let us now modify the model to include different tiers of governments. We assume 
that the federal level is in charge of providing the unemployment benefit while the 
states provide the public inputs.4 Both levels of government share the tax on 
employed workers (with the tax rates eT  and et  chosen by the federal and state 
governments, respectively; eee tT  ). The revenues collected from the tax on 
profits are assigned in a proportion   (which is exogenously determined) to the 
states )10(   , while the tax rate f  is exclusively decided by the federal 
government. 
In such a framework, let us assume that the states behave as Nash players, that is, 
each subnational government ignores the impact of its fiscal decisions on federal 
revenues. Therefore, the optimisation problem to be solved by the states is: 
     
 
,
,
0..
)(
eo
o
fe
ffbee
ww
GwNN
SGNtts
ubuNMwNuWMax






       (13) 
where S  is a vertical lump-sum from the federal government to states. The last 
inequality refers to the distortion existing in the labour market, which is the reason 
for unemployment. The first-order conditions for et , G  and   give: 
    ee utFOC :           (14) 
     01: GeGueG FtNuuNGFOC         (15) 
   0: SGNtFOC fe            (16) 
Observe that we, for later use, define the first-order condition for G  to be a 
function   whereas we also use the short notation   for the state government´s 
budget constraint. Equation (14) sets up the same rule for choosing the optimal tax 
rate on employed workers in a centralised country as in a world with two tiers of 
government. This is a direct consequence of using lump-sum taxes. Even in the 
presence of tax sharing between different levels of government, if household 
behaviour is not affected by taxes, there is no scope for vertical tax externalities. 
By contrast, and leaving aside the discussion on the optimal levels of G  (see 
Martinez and Sanchez (2010) for a graphical analysis and Martinez and Sjongren 
(2013) with a similar model to this one), let us begin by comparing the provision of 
the public input in a two-tier public sector (equation (15)) with the provision in a 
                                                                                                         
4 This distribution of spending responsabilities is not crucial for the results, which would be symmetric 
with an inverse vertical assignment of public expenditures. Anyway, the scheme we follow here is in line 
with the mainstream of theory of fiscal federalism. 
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unitary public sector (12). The term eGtN  differs from its equivalent in (12), 
namely, )( bN eG  . As long as the federal government implements a non-
negative lump-sum tax eT  on employed workers, it follows that since the states 
decide over G , this tends to reduce the over-provision bias that the presence of 
unemployment creates in the provision of public inputs. In other words, expression 
(15) is closer to (9) than equation (12).5 
In this regard, and contrary to the conventional view in the literature on vertical 
externalities, we propose here that more federalism may lead to more production 
efficiency. To see this in an extreme case, assume that all rent taxes accrue to the 
states ( 1 ); the federal government needs to be financed by a negative fiscal 
grant (from states) and/or by charging a positive tax rate eT  on workers. This latter 
solution involves an optimal rule for the provision of public inputs closer to the 
production efficiency condition, minimising the differential effect that the presence 
of unemployment creates in the discussion on optimality. 
Consequently, the behaviour of federal government becomes a crucial issue to 
determine the effect of unemployment on the achievement of the production 
efficiency condition in the provision of public inputs. This is what we study in the 
next section. 
The ability of the federal government to replicate the 
centralised outcome 
A common way of correcting vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities is to 
assume that the federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the 
lower level governments. In such a context, the sequence of the game is as 
follows. First, the federal government decides on eT , f , S  and, residually, on 
b , while taking into consideration the states' reactions to changes in federal policy 
variables. Second, the state governments determine G  and et , treating as 
exogenous all the decision variables of the upper-level of government. Despite the 
fact that the federal government is the first-mover, we are not here strictu sensu in 
the presence of a pure Stackelberg leader since it lacks enough policy instruments 
that are strategically complementary (or substitute) to the instruments of the 
follower(s). Under the new conditions, the optimisation problem facing the federal 
government can now be stated as follows: 
     ffbee kubuNMkwkNuWMax   )(   (17) 
0)()1(..  kSbNMkkkNTts fe   
),,,,,( NMSTGG fe        (18) 
),,,,,( NMSTtt feee        (19) 
 GwNN ,  
.eo ww   
                                                                                                         
5 It is straightforward to show that with full employment no vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities 
appear. 
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Expressions (18) and (19) are the states' reaction functions.6 As written above, 
given that we have set up lump-sum taxes on labour income, there is no scope for 
vertical tax externalities. In other words, the changes in the federal tax rates do not 
affect the marginal cost of the public funds perceived by the state governments 
and, consequently, the state tax rates. Therefore, for solving the federal problem, 
some information on comparative statics of these reaction functions is required. To 
do that, we start from the first-order conditions of states (15) and (16).7 
Differentiating the functions   and   (and ignoring superindex "e" for sake of 
simplicity in the notation) produces: 
0 fSTtG ddSdTdtdG f          (20) 
0 fSTtG ddSdTdtdG f          (21) 
This two-equation system can be expressed using a matricial form as follows (and 
after solving for dG  and dt ): 






















 
fST
ST
tG
tG
d
dS
dT
dt
dG
f
f


1
       (22) 
From (22), we can retrieve: 
)( TtTtT AGdT
dG       (23) 
)( StStS AGdS
dG        (24) 
)( fff ttf AGd
dG
       (25) 
)( TgTgT AtdT
dt       (26) 
)( SgSgS AtdS
dt       (27) 
)( fff ggf Atd
dt
       (28) 
where A  is tGtG  1 . 
Returning to the federal government´s problem, it is clear that its budget constraint 
can be written as    NM
SNT feb 
 1  . Plugging this into the objective function (17), 
we obtain the first-order conditions for the policy variables of the federal 
government:  
                                                                                                         
6 Both equations are not fundamentally reduced forms since ),( GwNN  ; the next technical 
developments are, however, fully consistent with the complete definition of the functions involved. 
7 The first-order condition (14) can be ignored in this analysis. In a sense, this expression does not 
admit any influence from federal variables and, consequently, it does not matter at this point. Anyway, 
expression (14) can be easily inserted in (15) without modifying substantially the analysis below. 
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0)()(
)())(()1()(:)(


TG
b
TGTGN
f
TGTTT
b
T
ee
GNuGwNGNFu
GbtbbuNMtuNTFOC
 (29a) 
0)()()(
)())(()()(:)(


f
GGN
f
Gt
b
G
bef
uGwNGNFu
GbtbbuNMGNutuNFOC
ff
fffff

  (29b) 
0)()(
)())(()()(:)(


SGSGN
f
SG
b
SGStS
b
S
e
GwNGNFu
GNuGbtbbuNMtuNSFOC
 (29c) 
0)()1(:)(  kSbNMkkkNTFOC fe    (29d) 
Taking into account that b  can be residually obtained from the above four 
equation-system, we simplify (29a)-(29d), which gives us the following results:  
0Tt          (30) 
N
t f

          (31) 
,1
N
tS          (32) 
where ),( GNFw N , (23)-(25) and the corresponding partial derivatives of   
and   (according to (15) and (16)) have been used. What is implicitly established 
in (30)-(32) is the inability of federal government to affect states' behaviour. One 
conclusion is that the federal tax rate on employed workers, eT , has no effect on 
the corresponding state tax rate, et  (equation (30)), but also none of the policy 
variables of the upper level of government has any impact on the state provision of 
public inputs. Indeed, from expressions (23)-(25), it is clear that 
0 ST GGG f , that is, there is no way through which the federal government 
can modify the provision of public inputs. The unique impact of the federal policy 
variables ( f  and S  on et ) is trivial: an increase (decrease) in some of them 
reduces (increases) the state tax rate in a magnitude given by the number of 
employed workers N . Therefore, the highest level of government is not able to 
replicate not only the first-best outcome of (9) but also the optimality rule for the 
provision of public inputs in a unitary country with unemployment.8 
New instruments for the federal government: 
complementary public inputs 
Things may be different if the federal government is also in charge of providing a 
public input, FG , which is assumed to be complementary with the state public input 
(now denoted SG ). This modification means that the model becomes more 
realistic in the sense that different levels of government are now jointly involved in 
financing complementary public infrastructure projects. This modification of the 
model implies that the production, profit and labour demand functions are modified 
as follows: 
                                                                                                         
8 Anyway, we must be aware that the first-best values for eT and et are guaranteed in each scenario as 
long as they are lump-sum taxes. 
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      GGKNGGKNF FSF  1,,,     (33) 
  ,,, wNGGNF SF        (34) 
         1 1111 1,, wGGGGwN SFSF .    (35) 
As before, combining (34) and (35), the profit function can be written as follows: 
 .,, SF GGw     
In a unitary country, the government maximises   fue kuuNMkkNuW  , 
subject to   0 bNMkkGkGkkN SFfe  . In a situation 
characterised by full employment ( NM  ), the optimal provision of public inputs 
is given by the standard production efficiency condition: 1 SF GG FF . By 
contrast, when unemployment appears as a result of non market-clearing wage 
rate, the first-order conditions w.r.t. FG  and SG  are, respectively: 
    1:  FFFF GGeGueGF FbNNuuNGFOC     (36) 
    1:  SSSS GGeGueGS FbNNuuNGFOC     (37) 
It is straightforward to show that when the government is concerned with the level 
of employment, if the effect of, say, the state public input on labour demand is 
higher than the equivalent effect by the federal public input ( FS GG NN  ), then the 
optimal amount of SG  will exceed FG . 
In a decentralised environment, in which both the federal and the state 
governments behave as Nash competitors, the first-order conditions for FG  and 
SG  are, respectively: 
    1:  FFFF GGeGueGF FbNTNuuNGFOC     (38) 
    1:  SSSS GGeGueGS FbNtNuuNGFOC     (39) 
Comparing these expressions with (36) and (37), it is clear that both types of public 
inputs will be underprovided if governments set positive tax rates on employed 
workers. Under these circumstances, the levels of FG  and SG  will be below the 
optimal ones derived from a centralised setting. In other words, each level of 
government decides a level of public input without considering its impact on other 
jurisdictions. Consequently, there now exists a double vertical expenditure 
externality from each level of government to the other. 
The question now is whether the federal government, behaving as Stackelberg 
leader, is able to replicate the second-best outcome. Recall that the answer to this 
question was "no" in a setting in which the federal instruments were eT , f , S  
and b . With the federal government also providing a public input, its optimisation 
problem is now: 
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     
0)()1(..
)(


kSkGbNMkkkNTts
kubuNMkwkNuWMax
Ffe
ffbee


  (40) 
),,,,,,( FfeS GNMSTGG       (41) 
),,,,,,( Ffeee GNMSTtt       (42) 
 FS GGwNN ,,  
.eo ww   
Note that the states' reaction functions (41) and (42) now include a new argument: 
the federal public input FG . As before, we first need to know some comparative 
statics of these functions. Equations (23)-(28) are still valid in the new context -with 
a slight change: the term A  must be substituted by A  -(see below)- and we only 
have to add the corresponding response of SG  and et  to the new federal policy 
instrument FG . Particularly, we can write: 
)( FF GtGtF
S
A
dG
dG        (43) 
),( FSFS GGGGF AdG
dt       (44) 
where A  is 
tSGtSG
 1 . 
In this regard, a significant difference appears when comparing these new results 
with the previous ones. While in Section 3 the federal government only had a very 
limited (and trivial) impact on state tax rate t  (recall expressions (30)-(32) and the 
fact that 0 ST GGG f ), things are now quite different. Consider first the 
case of F
S
dG
dG ; after some algebra manipulations it can be seen that the effect of 
changes in the federal public input on the state provision of public inputs is given 
by: 
     .0//   SSSSSS FSFSFS GGGGueGG GGGG
ue
GG
F
S
FtNuuN
FtNuuN
dG
dG


 
This means that an increase in the federal public input encourages the provision of 
the state public input. That is, there is an additional channel through which the 
federal government can affect states' behaviour. In the case of the state tax rate, 
something similar happens: 
0


  FS GF
S
GF
N
dG
dGN
N
t
dG
dt
. 
But here the effect of federal public input on state policy variable is not so clear. 
Indeed, an increase in the federal public input may lead to either an increase or a 
decrease in the state tax rate on employed workers. Anyway, it is worth noting that 
again federal government may affect states' behaviour, which was not possible 
under the previous assumptions. 
Given this, the first-order condition for the optimal provision of FG  is as follows: 
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     
.1)(
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F
S
GGF
S
GG
F
ue
dG
dG
G
ue
GF
dG
dGNNbT
dG
dGNTN
dG
dtN
uuNuuN
GFOC
SFSF
F
S
SF
   (45) 
After some algebra manipulations, it can be shown that to replicate the second-
best condition (36) requires to hold: 
.FS G
ue
F
S
G Fb
uu
dG
dGN 


            (46) 
If the individual utility is assumed to be linear ( ccu )( ), it is straightforward to 
prove that both sides of expression (46) have the same sign. Hence, to replicate 
the second best outcome for the provision of public inputs is a real possibility when 
federal government can spend money in public inputs which are complementary to 
state public inputs. 
Concluding remarks 
Vertical externalities usually involve challenges for efficiency in federal countries. 
Sharing taxes between different levels of government or the provision of certain 
public expenditures with effects on other tiers of government revenues imply 
deviations from the optimality rules, which would be obtained in a centralised world. 
However, the presence of vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities can be 
disregarded if lump-sum taxes are used. Indeed, the idea of governments affecting 
fiscal decisions taken by others requires distorting taxes able to modify households' 
behaviour. 
All these general statements have to be qualified in the presence of 
unemployment, and this has been what we have done in this paper. Particularly, 
we have built a simple model with lump-sum taxes and unemployment in which the 
optimal rule for the provision of public inputs depends on whether the structure of 
the country is federal or not. Indeed, while there is no scope for vertical tax 
externalities (the fact of using lump-sum taxes here is crucial), a deviation from the 
second-best outcome takes place when states are in charge of the provision of 
productivity-enhancing public factors and the federal government finances 
unemployment benefits. 
We have confirmed that the optimality condition for the provision of public inputs 
must consider the impact of this type of public expenditure on employment and, 
consequently, on public spending in unemployment benefits. As the production 
efficiency condition for public inputs is not satisfied even in the case of a 
centralised country, we have analysed what would occur when states behaving as 
Nash players take part in the game. Since sub-national governments do not take 
into account the effect of their public expenditures on unemployment benefits, the 
over-provision of public inputs (compared to the first-best case with full 
employment) is lower with a federal structure than in a unitary country. 
When we have wondered about the capability of federal government to replicate 
the outcome of a unitary country, we have assumed that the upper level of 
government behaves as a Stackelberg leader, considering the states’ reaction 
functions. Under such a scenario, we have concluded that, unlike previous papers, 
federal government is not able to internalise the vertical expenditure externality. 
Federal policy variables have no impact on states' decision variables. 
In part, this is caused by using lump-sum taxes; indeed, distortionary taxation can 
affect agents' behaviour and this is the way through which all the effects of public 
inputs can be internalised. By contrast, when the federal government is also in 
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charge of providing a public input which is complementary to the state public input, 
it is possible to replicate the second-best outcome for the optimal provision of such 
as public inputs. 
A number of issues arise for further research. Asymmetries at regional level in the 
federation can be taken into consideration. Given our federal budget constraint, the 
characterisation of equilibria may then involve that not all the resources collected 
by the upper level of government in a region must be spent in such territory; 
consequently, some possibilities for horizontal redistribution arise and even for 
explicit equalisation schemes. Also under this framework, in the presence of mobile 
production factors, phenomena of tax competition may take place, with the 
consequent effects on efficiency and regional labour markets. A third avenue for 
further research could be based on an alternative way for including unemployment 
in the model. Let think us, for instance, of a system of generous enough 
unemployment benefits and in which the workers take labour decisions. 
As a policy implication we would underline how important the coordination of 
different levels of government is to attain social welfare gains. Indeed, the design of 
federal and state fiscal policies must take into account the magnitude of their cross 
effects on the tax revenues of other tiers of government. Particularly, this is true in 
the case of public infrastructure because this type of government expenditure is 
very vulnerable to public spending cuts and its benefits are very visible. Increasing 
the coordination in the provision of public transport infrastructure (some roads may 
be provided at the regional level, whereas railways may be provided by the federal 
government) translates into more social welfare, part of which will be in terms of 
employment. This would be especially appropriate in countries like Spain, where 
the unemployment rates have reached extraordinarily high values in the aftermath 
of the Great Recession. 
This is especially pertinent in the context of fiscal austerity of many developed 
countries in the aftermath of this recession. Growth-enhancing policies such as 
those related to public infrastructure projects are able to generate positive fiscal 
externalities in the form of reduced public spending in unemployment benefits and 
increased tax revenues from labour taxation. This is a valuable benefit that should 
not be underestimated when designing economic policies. 
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